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HICCUPS IN THE ADOPTION OF INNOVATION 
FOR COMPLEX FINANCIAL MODELS 
ABSTRACT 
 
There exists a vast and growing body of literature that describes the mechanisms by 
which innovations diffuse through a population, as well as factors that affect the speed of 
adoption of an innovation.  This body of literature tends to focus on incidences of 
successful innovations.  However, study of innovations that fail to diffuse widely may be 
equally valuable.  Furthermore, major diffusion research has not addressed financial 
innovation in a meaningful way (Rogers, 2003).  This paper focuses on complex state-of-
the-art financial innovations, developed and proposed by academicians as solutions to 
real-world problems.  This paper (1) discusses a novel financial strategy based on the use 
of sophisticated financial engineering products; (2) the adoption (or lack thereof) of 
complicated real option evaluation models to augment capital budgeting decisions; and 
(3) a case study to highlight implementation issues for a highly complex fixed income 
option model. 
 
 
 
 
HICCUPS IN THE ADOPTION OF INNOVATION 
FOR COMPLEX FINANCIAL MODELS 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In his comprehensive study of the diffusion of innovations, Everett Rogers (2003) 
describes a curious case of an innovation that most readers of this article would agree is 
unambiguously of value but that, nevertheless, failed to diffuse through the society to 
which it was introduced.  The innovation in question was the practice of boiling drinking 
water obtained from potentially unsanitary sources prior to use in an effort to reduce the 
incidence of typhoid and other waterborne diseases.  The change agent, a state healthcare 
worker, was charged with persuading housewives in a coastal Peruvian village to include 
the boiling of drinking water in their everyday behavior.  The effort included numerous 
visits to village households, explanations of germ theory of disease and presentations by 
medical doctors, espousing the benefits of boiling water.  After a two-year campaign, 
only five percent of the village households had adopted the practice.  Why did such an 
obviously beneficial innovation fail to diffuse through the Peruvian village households? 
 
The same question can be asked of some complex state-of-the-art financial solutions to 
real-world problems.   
 
On February 20, 2001, the Financial Times (London) described a novel proposal to 
redefine corporate dealmaking.  The concept is to establish a financial service enterprise 
to provide strategic advice that includes use of financial derivatives and other financial 
contracts to achieve ends that would otherwise be accomplished via traditional business 
solutions, e.g., mergers and acquisitions, corporate partnering.  Two ex-J.P. Morgan 
executives intended to team with General Re, a reinsurance firm owned by Berkshire 
Hathaway, to deliver the financial services. 
 
This new paradigm could have enormous implications for the financial services industry.  
Suppose, as the Financial Times proposed, that General Re can assist a manufacturing 
client vertically integrate its operations without actually acquiring the commodity 
supplier.  In essence, General Re would attempt to construct a package of derivatives 
(market-based and/or proprietary) to guarantee a supply of the commodity to the 
manufacturer.  Therefore, General Re would be employing a financial securities-based 
solution to replace an oftentimes cumbersome physical transaction, i.e., a merger. 
 
Specialty finance firms of this type illustrate the evolution of the financial service 
provider away from highly customized, proprietary and illiquid solutions toward a 
reliance on market mechanisms to address business problems.  Eventually as markets 
become even more liquid, it is reasonable to project that market-based solutions of this 
type might be employed in a wide range of strategic advice applications. 
 
While, to our knowledge, the J.P. Morgan executives and General Re never came 
together on this project, the potential obstacles to adoption of this innovation were 
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considerable.  Would senior management of the client firms embrace solutions that are 
novel, potentially quite complex and outside the dimensions of traditional tools?  If so, 
what steps might the financial service provider take to facilitate the adoption of its 
strategic advice and execution strategies? 
 
Copeland and Antikarov (2001) describe the difficulties in convincing senior 
management at Airbus Industrie to implement real option technology.  The discussion is 
framed around five attributes of innovations that facilitate adoption, as described by 
Rogers (2003).  Our presentation of the Financial Times proposal in section II of this 
paper follows the same framework.  While both academics and practitioners would agree 
that there is significant value-added in analyzing management flexibility with real option 
techniques, recent empirical evidence suggests that the adoption of this technology 
appears to have stalled (Teach, 2003).  Furthermore, Graham and Harvey (2002) point 
out that there is a trend for managers that have used the technology to drop it as a part of 
the capital budgeting process in future projects.   
 
The purpose of this paper is to reinforce the issues raised in the Financial Times and real 
option examples with a finance case study.  In the early to mid-1980s, one of the authors 
was involved in bringing fixed income option pricing techniques to the trading floor of 
some major investment banks.   As will be described below, fixed income option pricing 
requires complex enhancements to the standard option pricing models, as the original 
models were developed to handle equity options.  The case is meant to highlight the 
implementation issues that the option pricing developers faced. 
 
A brief literature review is found in Section II of this paper.  Section III contains the case 
study, with names and affiliations disguised.  Finally, in Section IV, we discuss some 
points that might be raised in using the case in a classroom setting.                                
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
As previously noted, much of what exists in the literature addresses factors that facilitate 
the adoption of innovations.  We present these factors in three categories: five attributes 
of innovations and fives steps of the innovation-decision process as described by Rogers 
in Diffusion of Innovations (2003), in terms of a cost-benefit analysis, and in terms of 
relationships and communication channels.  We then present proposed reasons for the 
recent apparent failure of real options technology to be widely adopted.  
 
Rogers (2003) discusses five attributes that innovations should possess to facilitate 
adoption: 
 
 Superior Ideas 
 Compatibility with Existing Solutions 
 Low Complexity 
 Triability 
 Observability 
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With respect to the proposed financial services innovation, consideration of the five key 
attributes could lead to inquiry along the following lines: 
 
Superior Ideas – In short, are the new ideas and approaches better than the old 
procedures?  Does the proposed solution accomplish the primary objectives at lower 
cost?  Can the market-based solution eliminate undesirables in the old solution, 
conceivably in the form of additional overhead, transaction costs and the like?   
 
Compatibility with Existing Solutions – How does the new approach relate to 
approaches now in use?  Can the old methods be related in any way to the new methods?  
If so, could an incremental presentation be made to “upgrade” from the old way to the 
proposed solution?   
 
Low Complexity – Ideally, all aspects of the product and technology should be 
transparent to all end users.  Even if the conceptual basis for the procedures will be clear, 
it will be quite a different matter to demonstrate the efficacy and efficiency of any 
securities-based program to be employed.  The financial service firm will face a huge 
educational component to take its solutions out of the “black box” and make them 
intuitive, compelling and understandable to senior management. 
 
Triability – It is inconceivable that management will agree to this new approach as an 
alternative to, for example, an acquisition if they have had no prior experience with the 
technology and capabilities.  It may well be necessary to introduce management to the 
procedures on a smaller scale to build empirical justification for the approach.  To spur 
management to look at the techniques, the service provider might apply the technology to 
selected situations that are clear to management.  The service provider will have at its 
disposal the various option pricing models and risk management software to provide 
scenario and sensitivity analysis at virtually no cost.  
 
Observability – The service provider must be able to demonstrate both the costs and 
benefits of the solution.  Fortunately, the proposed solution is meant to replicate an 
outcome in using older business solutions with which management is familiar.  As such, 
General Re isn’t required to “sell” the basic transaction, but rather to communicate the 
differential advantage to the proposed methodology. 
 
Rogers (2003) also describes five steps in the innovation-decision process: (1) 
knowledge, when a potential adopter learns about an innovation; (2) persuasion, when 
the adopter forms an attitude, favorable or otherwise, about the innovation; (3) decision, 
when a decision is made to adopt or reject the innovation; (4) implementation, when the 
adopter puts the new technology to use; and (5) confirmation, when the adopter looks to 
reinforce or reconsider the adoption decision.  Stabilizing adoption in the implementation 
and confirmation stages, including enabling the end-users to become self-sufficient in the 
use of the new technology, increases the likelihood of long-term adoption of the 
innovation.  Hall (2003) points out that in the knowledge and persuasion stages, triability 
and observability as described by Rogers, reduce uncertainty for the adopter of an 
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innovation.  Producers of a new technology may also reduce uncertainty for a potential 
adopter by providing training in use of the technology at no or reduced cost.   
 
Hall also points out that relative advantage and complexity are issues related to a cost-
benefit analysis.  In addition to the price of acquiring an innovative technology, the cost 
of an innovation often includes the cost of complementary tools, software, and/or 
learning.  (Conner, 1998; Hall, 2003)  Typically the costs associated with adoption of an 
innovation are fixed and upfront, while the benefits are not only uncertain but are 
expected to accrue over time.  Furthermore, adoption of an innovation is generally seen 
to be an absorbing state, i.e., typically an old solution to a problem is abandoned in favor 
of a new solution (Conner, 1998; Hall, 2003; Kotter, 1996).  Because of the fixed nature 
of costs and the irreversibility that is characteristic of many new technologies, a firm’s 
decision is likely to be influenced by the firm’s position and the market structure of its 
industry.  However, a financial derivative solution to a vertical integration problem is 
likely to be less expensive and more easily reversed than would, say, a merger of firms.   
 
Hall and Luque explain the adoption decision in terms of option theory.  Hall (2003) 
proposes that at any point in time, rather than deciding whether to adopt or to not adopt, a 
potential adopter of a new technology is deciding whether to adopt or to delay adoption 
until later.  Luque (2002) equates the value of the option to the investment threshold, i.e., 
the point at which the firm will invest in a new technology rather than delay adoption.  
Greater opportunities to invest elsewhere and/or greater uncertainty regarding the 
benefits of the proposed innovation result in greater call option value and therefore a 
higher investment threshold.  In this case, a decision-maker is likely to delay adoption.  
Likewise, a less easily reversed adoption decision has less put option value and 
consequently a higher investment threshold. 
 
Types of innovation decisions can be defined in terms of the role social systems play in 
the adoption process (Rogers, 2003).  Optional innovation decisions are made 
independently by an individual without input from other members of the social system.  
Collective innovation decisions are made by consensus among members of the social 
system.  Authority innovation decisions are made by a handful of individuals who hold 
power, status, or specialized knowledge within the social system.  External or social 
attributes that impact the diffusion process include the type of decision as described, the 
communication channels used for conveying information about the new technology, the 
nature of the social systems present within the organization as well as to what extent the 
organization is networked with other organizations, and the extent of the promotion 
efforts of the change agent.   
 
Conner (1998) addresses the importance of the human due diligence in the change 
process in order to increase the likelihood of an adequate return on change.  Human due 
diligence may include increasing resources available to employees for incorporating the 
new technology or reducing unnecessary problems that may be expected to result from 
the change.  These actions serve to reduce uncertainty and unnecessary cost associated 
with adoption of a new technology, echoing what we find presented by Conner (1998), 
Hall (2003), and Rogers (2003). 
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Rogers (2003) also finds that the establishment of an information exchange relationship 
between the change agent and potential adopter is highly important.  With regards to 
communication channels, interpersonal communication has been found to be more 
effective than other forms in bringing about behavioral changes such as adoption of new 
technology.  Furthermore, homophilous communication, occurring between two people 
who are more similar, is generally more effective than is heterophilous communication, 
occurring between two people who are different.  This may be because a change agent 
who is homophilous with a potential adopter is better able to understand the adopter’s 
perspective of a problem and is therefore able to frame the discussion of the relative 
advantage of a proposed innovation in a relevant context.  (Hall, 2003; Rogers, 2003) 
 
An organization’s network with other organizations may also impact the likelihood of it 
adopting a new technology.  Davis (1991) found that firms with a greater degree of 
interconnectedness to other firms were more likely to adopt normative innovations 
earlier.  In some cases, this relationship may be explained by the role standards play in 
accelerating or retarding the diffusion process (Hall, 2003).  In many cases, technological 
standards facilitate learning required for use of the new technology, increases the 
potential market, and therefore encourages adoption.  Indeed, the larger potential market 
increases the ease with which an adoption decision can be reversed, hence serves as a put 
option (Luque, 2002).   It is interesting to note, however, that customization may be an 
attractive attribute of a financial innovation such as a derivatives solution to vertical 
integration problem.   Nevertheless, adoption of these new technologies may be 
facilitated by the perception of standardization.     
 
It is interesting to note that that real option technology, such as the option to delay 
adoption a new technology as described above, provides an example of a complex 
finance innovation that appears to have failed to be widely adopted in capital budgeting.  
Real option technology employs modern option pricing theory to evaluate management 
flexibility that is often available in capital budgeting projects.  Option pricing theory 
itself is quite complex, requiring specialized modeling and analysis.  Applying these 
procedures to corporate project selection is further complicated by the complex 
contingencies often found in the projects and the usual lack of the specific financial data 
required to implement the technique.  Refer to Merton (1973) for the development of the 
option pricing model and Amram and Kulatilaka (1999) for its application to real 
options.     
 
Teach (2003) observes that corporate CFOs have been slow to adopt real options 
technology despite its clear superiority over traditional NPV analysis by way of its 
inclusion of management flexibility.  In a 2000 survey regarding management tools used 
by managers, Bain & Co. found that only nine percent of the managers surveyed used 
real options analysis.  Furthermore, the survey found that, while the average defection 
rate for management tools included in the survey was 11 percent, 32 percent of the 
managers who had used real options technology had abandoned its use during the year.  
In a similar study in 2003, real options technology no longer appears on the list of tools 
used by managers. 
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Teach (2003) proposes several possible reasons for the failure of real options innovation 
to diffuse through corporate finance practice.   Among these are the sophisticated 
mathematics inherent to real options analysis and the “consequent lack of transparency 
and simplicity”.  Software development firms such as Decisioneering offer software 
applications that analyze real options; however, such software requires its own inherent 
learning curve.  Teach also points to suspicions that analysis of growth options, a type of 
real option, contributed to the outrageous valuations of some dot com firms in the early 
1990s. 
 
In the next section, we present a two-part case study that describes a complex financial 
innovation that failed to be adopted in one instance and was adopted in the short term in 
another instance.  This is followed by a discussion of possible reasons for the failure of a 
long-term adoption of the innovative model, framed in the context of Roger’s five 
attributes. 
 
 
III. THE GUTSIR GROUP, INC.
1
 
 
In late 1983, Jerry DeLong, Vice Chairman of Lararis Bank, invited The Gutsir Group, 
Inc., to the Bank to discuss the potential use of modern option pricing techniques in the 
Bank’s securities dealing operation.  Lararis Bank was a preeminent merchant bank, with 
major offices in New York, London and Tokyo.  Delong had been interested in academic 
finance since his days as a student at the Harvard Business School.  He was convinced 
that introducing modern option techniques to the trading floor could provide high value-
added to the Bank.  Since the practical application of the techniques was in its infancy, 
Delong determined that it would be best to contract with outside consultants with close 
ties to the academic community that was on the forefront of option theory development.  
In fact, after a careful inventory of the research and technology capabilities at Lararis, he 
decided to follow this approach. 
 
Gutsir was incorporated in 1981 as a specialized firm to develop and provide state-of the-
art financial problem solving solutions.  The firm was started by two academics, one 
maintaining his academic affiliation and the other installed as a full time President and 
CEO, and was located in the greater Boston area.  The firm had close ties to the major 
academic finance centers in Boston.  As such, the firm had easy access to the premier 
innovators in modern finance theory and to a pool of highly qualified potential 
employees.  In fact, the firm drew its employees from this pool.  At any point in time, 
Gutsir typically had only three or four clients with whom it was working on highly 
technical projects.  A typical project would require considerable financial innovation and 
often lead to an effort to transfer the innovation to the client organization for ongoing use.  
The client often requested financial solutions be delivered in the form of user-friendly 
computer programs.  Project duration could run from many months to several years. 
 
                                            
1
 This case is to be used as a basis for discussion rather than to illustrate either the effective or ineffective 
handling of a business situation. 
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THE STAWLEY-AMY-HILL PARTNERSHIP, INC. (SAH) EXPERIENCE 
 
At about the time Delong phoned Gutsir, Gutsir was completing an assignment with the 
Stawley-Amy-Hill Partnership, Inc., to develop a fixed income option valuation 
capability.  SAH was a “white shoe” investment bank that had, in recent years, started a 
proprietary trading operation.  In the mid-1980s, practical applications of the famous 
Black-Scholes-Merton option pricing model were well underway, but much less work 
had been done to expand the model’s capabilities to the fixed income arena.  For 
example, the theoretical extensions of the model to fixed income were only just 
beginning to appear in the academic literature. 
 
Gutsir was recruited to join the SAH project by one of the leading academic innovators in 
option theory who had himself been retained by SAH.  For over a year, the project team 
worked intensively to develop the theoretical framework and implementation procedures 
for fixed income option valuation.  As part of its due diligence, SAH had this work 
evaluated by outside experts.  The experts opined that the procedures were viable and 
highly likely to provide value-added on the SAH trading floor.  Yet, the senior 
management of SAH decided not to proceed with the implementation phase and 
terminated the project. 
 
The principals of Gutsir tried to understand why such obviously innovative technology 
addressing a highly relevant business line for SAH was not adopted.  There was no doubt 
in their minds, that if the developed procedures worked as advertised, SAH would be far 
ahead of competitors in a very high margin business.  A few points were clear to Gutsir: 
 
 Based on the specialized analytical techniques used, it was likely that no one 
working on the project from within SAH understood the technology completely. 
 
 The initiative and funding for the project came from the research division within 
SAH.  The R&D department at SAH was massive and important in the corporate 
hierarchy (the SAH CEO at this time, Glenwood Mackus, was an MIT-trained 
technology aficionado).  Furthermore, a senior R&D executive was the project 
sponsor within the bank and part of the project team.  Yet, Gutsir suspected that 
the most senior management at the firm either did not have the project on their 
radar screens and/or were intimidated by the subject matter. 
 
 The client made it clear that the consultants were hired primarily to do the 
analytical “heavy lifting”, so Gutsir channeled it efforts to developing elegant, 
high level technology.  In effect, Gutsir was offering a “black box” to end users at 
SAH. 
 
As it would happen, the discussions with Delong at Lararis led to a consulting contract 
for Gutsir to build a fixed income option valuation model!  There would be no conflict 
with the work just done for SAH because (1) some of the key concepts and techniques 
had by now found their way into the academic literature in the public domain, and (2) 
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Gutsir would make fundamental changes to the proprietary techniques it had used earlier 
for SAH. 
 
THE OPTION PRICING MODEL (OPM) 
 
Pricing of options has been of interest to academicians and practitioners since early in the 
20
th
 century.  Prior to the 1970s, systematic attempts to value and analyze options had 
largely failed under the weight of contrived and unrealistic assumptions about investor 
preferences, market structure, etc.  In 1973, Professors Fischer Black and Myron Scholes 
published a scientific paper that made the option valuation problem tractable and, in fact, 
lead to a closed form formula to value European-style (exercisable only at expiry) equity 
options.  Shortly thereafter Professor Robert Merton solidified the theoretical basis for 
the solution and provided valuable extensions.  Merton and Scholes would go on to win 
the Nobel Prize in economics for their work (Black died before the Prize was awarded, 
and the Nobel may not be awarded posthumously). 
 
The fundamental insight in the OPM is that the key financial characteristics of an option 
can be exactly replicated with a specific position in the underlying asset coupled with 
riskless borrowing or lending.  A dynamic strategy in the underlying and borrowing or 
lending can be established to “replicate” the payoffs to the option.  Then, to avoid the 
existence of arbitrage, the replicating portfolio must be equal in value to the option.  
Black, Scholes and Merton showed that using a stochastic dynamic programming 
technique, the appropriate replicating portfolio could be determined during each time 
point during the life of the option.  Dynamic programming, which is a backwards in time 
solution technique, is necessary because, ex ante, the only time point at which the value 
of the option is known is at expiry, i.e., at the end of the life of the option.  It had been 
well-known for some time that the option value must be the maximum of its in-the-
money value or zero at that time point.  The solution procedure requires stochastic 
dynamic programming because the underlying asset (the value of the common stock in 
the case of equity options) is a random variable, not a deterministic quantity.  Needless to 
say, the solution methodology at the time, and still today, was quite sophisticated.  The 
good news is that the valuation formula derived, while looking quite ominous, can be 
easily programmed into a spreadsheet or even a hand held calculator.  It has been 
amazing to observe how quickly this technology has migrated from academic seminars to 
widespread use in the field. 
 
However, as practitioners began to use and better understand the OPM, they realized that 
there was a broad class of options for which it did not apply.  For example, the OPM was 
not suited for American-style options which are exercisable at any time during their life 
and which are, by far, the most commonly traded variant in virtually every option market.  
The OPM formula did not strictly apply if the underlying asset paid a cash distribution 
(e.g., common stock dividends) or if the stochastic variable was not equity, but for 
example, interest rates.  Furthermore, as the option markets developed, ever more 
complicated covenants were included in option structures.  Invariably, the covenants 
pushed the option beyond the scope of the OPM. 
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To address these valuation challenges, the analyst could not work directly with the 
elegant solution of Black, Scholes and Merton, but rather had to employ sophisticated 
numerical approximation procedures.  These techniques begin by building a huge 
decision tree in which all contingencies and covenants are included.  Next, the 
methodology proceeds backwards from the option’s expiry date in the decision tree to the 
present time – numerical dynamic programming.  While the OPM assumed that trading 
took place continuously in time, any numerical procedure must, by its nature, be a 
discrete time approach.  Moving the analysis from a continuous to discrete time setting 
introduced additional complications and necessary approximations.  At the time of the 
Lararis inquiry to Gutsir, analysts were just beginning to address these important 
extensions to the OPM. 
 
THE LARARIS BANK EXPERIENCE 
 
Jerry Delong understood that considerable research effort would be required to develop 
the fixed income option modeling environment.  While academics continued to make 
considerable progress on the theoretical enhancements to the OPM, precious little had 
been done on the practical implementation issues.  Delong approved a project during 
which Gutsir would develop the technology using Lararis traders, the eventual end users 
of the technology, as a resource. 
 
Both Gutsir and Delong agreed that it was crucial to have these traders involved early on 
in the project, both because they could provide input directly from the trading floor and to 
give them an opportunity to “embrace” the technology early on.  Delong made it clear to 
the traders that the project was a high priority and that their cooperation and input were 
crucial.   
 
To begin the project, it was necessary for Gutsir to develop the financial modeling 
approach.  To a first approximation, Gutsir staff worked independently in their Boston 
offices.  The work involved building a solid mathematical foundation for the new option 
pricing model.  This was very specialized work at an abstract level.  As such, during this 
period of approximately six months, Gutsir effectively had no contact with the traders 
and very limited contact with Delong.  It was clear that Delong understood the nature of 
this phase of the project.  Gutsir was cautiously optimistic and hopeful that the traders 
would maintain enthusiasm for the work. 
 
At the conclusion of this initial phase of the project, an extensive seminar/presentation 
was scheduled for Gutsir to discuss the work to-date.  Gutsir personnel made a 
comprehensive presentation of the model to be built.  As with the SAH presentation, it 
seemed to Gutsir that none of the clients in the room completely understood the materials 
presented.  In fact, the traders, notorious for short attention spans, seemed preoccupied 
with monitoring their trading positions. 
 
On the other hand, it appeared that everyone was comfortable taking everything 
presented at face value.  Gutsir suspected that much of this acquiescence came because 
the traders weren’t trained to evaluate the complex finance on its own merits.  It became 
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obvious that the traders would be treating the financial model as a “black box”.  
However, to Gutsir’s delight, the traders were very eager to learn that the next phase of 
the project would involve them – to design user interface computer screens, to establish 
the performance parameters for the software, etc. 
 
Over the next six months, Gutsir personnel developed a good working rapport with the 
Lararis traders.  Gutsir devoted many person-hours to working on the trading floor and 
asking traders for input.  As prototype versions were prepared, the traders assisted in the 
validation process.  As with the seminar presentations, the traders were preoccupied with 
their trading positions at all times.  When Gutsir asked the traders any in-depth questions 
that required them to fully engage in the developmental work, it was clear to Gutsir that 
the traders took the “path of least resistance” to get to a solution.  Because of this, Gutsir 
could only really count on the traders for snippets of information, most factual, not 
conceptual. 
 
Within a short period after this development phase, Gutsir installed a self-contained fixed 
income option model on the trading floor for beta testing.  The plan was to run the system 
side-by-side with the trader’s books for bond options and interest rate caps, floors, swaps 
and swaptions.  Traders were authorized to use the system to assist with their actual 
trading as they deemed appropriate.  Miraculously, the system performed well!  Since the 
model tended to price the underlying asset relatively accurately, traders became confident 
in using the system in their operations. 
 
To see why traders reacted this way, consider an option on a bond.  Since the fixed 
income option model was driven off interest rates and their stochastic movements, the 
model was fully capable of valuing both the bond (the underlying) and the option on the 
bond.  But in many cases, the bond (as opposed to the option) is traded on a relatively 
large, liquid and active market.  In such circumstances, traders would deem the market 
price to be reliable.  Then, if the model price for the bond matched (up to a small error) 
its observable market price, the traders had more confidence that the option price was 
also sensible.  This result partially explains why the model quickly gained traction as the 
valuation and hedging engine for dealing in the fixed income derivatives.  Without 
exception, all of the trading books showed profitable operations. 
 
As time passed, Gutsir staff observed several situations that affected the seamless 
adoption of the technology.  These circumstances were even more prevalent in the cases 
of new traders, personnel who had not been involved in the developmental phases of the 
project: 
 
 Computer Bugs – It is inevitable in any large computer system that there will be 
programming errors.  These errors are typically embedded in the computer code 
and can compromise any aspect of the system: input/output functions, processing, 
etc.  When these errors occur, the system will typically shut down, lock up at the 
faulty operation and/or cycle through improper processing avenues.  Typically, to 
solve the problem, a software engineer must debug the program and provide a 
software patch to end users.  Clearly, in a trading environment in which trading 
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opportunities may only be present for a matter of seconds or minutes, breakdowns 
of this type can be debilitating.  In virtually all such situations, the trader will lose 
the opportunity to put on a potentially profitable trade.  Traders seemed to have 
zero tolerance for even a few occurrences of these computer bugs.  In fact, Gutsir 
noticed a tendency for traders to revert to naïve pricing models with fundamental 
weaknesses so as to avoid the occasional bug. 
 
 Extensions and Enhancements – The market for fixed income derivatives was in 
the 1980s, and is still today, a rapidly evolving market in which new variants of 
options are devised on a regular basis.  In fact, the field of financial engineering 
concerns itself with building new option contracts to address special purposes or 
to fill a new market niche.  Traders naturally wanted and expected the model to be 
generalized to the new financial instruments in “real time”!  Of course, in most 
cases, this was impossible.  The traders typically failed to remember that the basic 
model itself ran to several hundred thousand lines of computer code, and that the 
new financial instruments may well contain features that could not easily be 
molded into the existing structure.  Seemingly small changes in the option 
covenants could have major ramifications in the valuation process.  Given the 
time it could take to develop the new theoretical framework and deliver a user-
friendly computer program update, the current trade opportunity would have 
disappeared, and it would be entirely likely that a new variant had already 
evolved. 
 
 Accuracy – When Gutsir first installed the fixed income valuation system in the 
mid-1980s, traders were delighted to be able to systematically evaluate the 
options, even with potential pricing errors of 10-30 percent.  Prior to systems of 
this nature, because the financial structures tended to be new and complex, the 
traders were not confident in their ability to price the instruments to even within a 
50 percent error range.  However, as the markets developed and hedging 
strategies got ever more sophisticated and complex, it became desirable to 
generate extremely accurate pricing results.  Of course, in complex situations 
using models that are numerical in nature, not exact, it is unrealistic to expect 
pricing to tight tolerances. 
 
EPILOGUE 
 
Despite the occasional hiccups with the technology, the Lararis traders successfully used 
the Gutsir system for several years.  It also is fair to say that the traders never became 
self-sufficient in using the system.  As such, the Bank kept Gutsir on retainer during the 
entire period.  Gutsir personnel interacted with the traders on virtually a daily basis, 
usually by telephone, to explain confusing results, talk through new trading opportunities, 
interpret system output, fix computer problems, etc.  This was a very intense period for 
Gutsir staff – because of the short time window available for most trades, Gutsir was 
expected to resolve any issues in real time.  Also, since the traders were doing trades with 
counterparties and on markets around the world, the real time aspect became 24/7.  
Needless to say, the situation was highly stressful for all parties involved.  Yet, since both 
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sides had a strong financial incentive (Gutsir earned its retainer fee; Lararis ran profitable 
trading books), the arrangement persisted. 
 
In the late 1980s, Lararis changed the management structure on its trading floor.  The 
new management team decided to move in a different technology direction and replaced 
the Gutsir technology with competitive systems.  Shortly thereafter, many of the traders 
that used the Gutsir system left the Bank to start their own money management firms or 
to move to other trading jobs. 
 
 
IV. THE GUTSIR GROUP, INC. – SOME TEACHING POINTS 
 
We believe that a productive methodology for analysis of the Gutsir Group, Inc. case is to 
consider the attributes of innovations as described by Rogers (2003).  The fundamentals 
of the case are quite similar to the Peruvian water and real option examples – beneficial 
innovations that are extremely likely to provide high value-added if implemented.  Yet, in 
the case of SAH, the technology was never implemented and in the case of Lararis, the 
innovative technology was not retained, even after accomplishing its desired function, 
i.e., supporting profitable trading books. 
 
One might infer from the case facts that the Gutsir personnel were fixated on building a 
state-of-the-art model, probably mistakenly believing that modeling elegance and 
analytical fire power were sufficient to “sell” the technology.  As MIT’s Professor Paul 
Samuelson quoted Albert Einstein in a recent PBS Nova episode (2000), “Elegance is for 
tailors”.  While our hypothetical tailor could survive on elegance alone, it will likely not 
be sufficient in other endeavors.  It would appear that Gutsir did not take the requisite 
marketing steps to facilitate the adoption of the fixed income model either at SAH or 
Lararis. 
 
How might the discussion address Roger’s five attributes? 
 
There are both direct and circumstantial evidence that Gutsir’s ideas are superior in many 
ways to the previously existing solutions.  The existing solutions had fundamental and 
obvious flaws – existing techniques could not be counted on to provide sensible results 
on a regular basis.  As such, the new technology faced a relatively low hurdle to 
demonstrate improved performance.  SAH had the work vetted by outside experts with a 
positive response.  The SAH project team included a luminary in academic OPM circles 
with an international reputation.  Gutsir personnel were trained at the top Boston area 
universities.  The discussion leader may well want to probe whether such credentials are 
either necessary and/or sufficient conditions to guarantee a superior end product.  One 
could compare this situation to the Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) hedge fund 
disaster.  LTCM boasted a star studded management and trading staff; see Perold (1999) 
for further discussion.   
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So, ex ante, there were good reasons to believe that the ideas would be superior.  
Furthermore, on an ex post basis, the technology showed itself to be superior as it 
delivered profitable fixed income books at Lararis. 
 
While both of Gutsir’s clients were aware of the Black-Scholes-Merton OPM, Gutsir had 
difficulty showing how the new technology was compatible with this existing solution to 
a similar problem.  When Gutsir tried in its seminars to both clients to make the link 
between existing theory and practice and the fixed income approach, the complexity 
inherent in both models came to the fore.  It is difficult to make the argument that the 
new is an upgrade from the old when clients can not evaluate the old or the new on their 
own merits.   
 
Lararis’ beta test was an attempt to address triability.  It would appear that the test was 
reasonably successful – based on the test, the traders later adopted the technology and 
were sufficiently receptive that they even used it during the trial period to trade the live 
book.    
 
The benefits of the new technology were clearly observable when the technology was in 
use – even on a daily basis!  The traders marked their book to market every day so as to 
demonstrate the profitability of the book.  Furthermore, prior to the implementation of the 
technology, there were no alternative analytics available to use.  Thus, the fixed income 
option innovation scored very high in the observability dimension, both in being able to 
define success (as measured by profitability) and at the execution level. 
 
However, it appears the technology did not continue to be superior in other ways when 
considered from the perspective of the end users, the traders.  The traders expected a 
simplistic solution into which they could plug assorted inputs and have a near 
instantaneous accurate output.  Traders lost patience with the delays caused by software 
bugs.  In addition, further iterations of the innovative technology that would take into 
account ever-changing option contract covenants, were not available with sufficient 
immediacy to meet the needs of the traders.  This lack of flexibility in all likelihood 
contributed to the failure of long-term adoption of the fixed income option technology.   
 
It could be interesting for the discussion leader to explore the ramifications of the traders’ 
short attention spans as discussed in the case.  During the seminars delivered by Gutsir, in 
dealing with the computer bugs and in insistence on instantaneous turnaround, the traders 
repeatedly demonstrated this characteristic.  Is there a fundamental disconnect between a 
personality and operating style necessary for the trading floor and first generation 
complex financial innovation?   
 
Rogers (2003) also describes seven roles of the change agent (Gutsir in our example) in 
the successful diffusion of an innovation.  A brief study of how these roles were played 
out in the Lararis case reveals that Gutsir was successful in fulfilling many of these roles, 
by Gutsir’s actions or by the client’s actions.  For example, Lararis identified a need for 
change and diagnosed problems with the then current technology.  Gutsir and Lararis, 
through its due diligence, created an intent to change, i.e., made a determination that 
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adoption of the proposed innovative option strategy was likely to be beneficial.   
Together, Gutsir and Lararis translated the intent to change into action by developing the 
new model and implementing it on a trial basis.  What roles, then, did Gutsir fulfill with 
less success? 
 
Rogers (2003) speaks to the importance of establishing an information exchange 
relationship.  Gutsir personnel established a relationship with Delong, the Lararis Vice 
Chairman, and set expectations regarding the amount of research effort that would be 
required in developing the new model.  However, the development of a good working 
rapport with the Lararis traders, who would be the end users of the technology, was 
delayed until six months into the project.  Is it possible that inclusion of traders earlier in 
the development process might have increased their understanding of the complexity 
underlying the “black box” solution that they expected?   
 
Rogers also speaks to the importance of stabilizing adoption and preventing 
discontinuance.  This is particularly important when a client is at the implementation or 
confirmation stage, the final stage in the five-stage innovation-decision process described 
in detail in Diffusion of Innovations (2003).  Clearly when Lararis was at a confirmation 
stage with the change of management, Gutsir was not successful in preventing 
discontinuance of the option valuation model.  Discontinuance may result from a decision 
to replace some technology with a better solution or from disenchantment with the 
technology.  It is likely that the Gutsir technology was replaced with an alternative 
solution. 
 
The final role of a change agent described by Rogers (2003) is achievement of a terminal 
relationship, meaning enabling the client to become self-sufficient in the use of the 
technology.  As explained in the epilogue, the Bank never became independent users of 
the option valuation technology.  Rather, Gutsir remained on retainer to the Bank, 
providing on-call availability at any hour for the duration of the relationship. 
 
In short, the Gutsir Group was able to demonstrate the superiority of its fixed income 
option pricing model to the old technology, as well as compatibility with existing 
solutions.  Gutsir was also able to demonstrate triability and observability for the most 
part.  However, there were several factors that may have contributed to failure to adopt 
the model in the long run.  Fits and starts in the implementation stage, characterized by 
frustration on the part of end users, seems to be due to a high complexity.   The 
discussion leader may want to draw an analogy between this case and the high 
complexity of the Airbus Industrie case.  The information exchange relationship was also 
problematic, possibly due to the heterphilous nature of the groups involved and the 
resultant inability of each to see the other group’s perspective, i.e.; the developers seemed 
to not appreciate the traders’ short attention spans and need for instantaneous answers, 
and the traders did not appreciate the complexity of the model.   
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